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Abstract—To exchange complex data structures in
distributed systems, documents written in context-free
languages are exchanged among communicating parties.
Unparsing these documents correctly is as important as
parsing them correctly because errors during unparsing result
in injection vulnerabilities such as cross-site scripting (XSS)
and SQL injection. Injection attacks are not limited to the web
world. Every program that uses input to produce documents
in a context-free language may be vulnerable to this class of
attack. Even for widely used languages such as HTML and
JavaScript, there are few approaches that prevent injection
attacks by context-sensitive encoding, and those approaches
are tied to the language.
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to derive context-sensitive
encoder from context-free grammars to provide correct
unparsing of maliciously crafted input data for all context-free
languages. The presented solution integrates encoder definition
into context-free grammars and provides a generator for
context-sensitive encoders and decoders that are used during
(un)parsing. This unparsing process results in documents where
the input data does neither influence the structure of the
document nor change their intended semantics. By defining
encoding during language definition, developers who use the
language are provided with a clean interface for writing and
reading documents written in that language, without the need
to care about security-relevant encoding.
I. INTRODUCTION
IT systems constantly exchange information in complex
formats, which requires thoughtful design and agreement
among communicating parties. In order to define these
formats, it is a good idea to use context-free grammars
because parsers for such languages can be constructed as
classic kinds of automata recognizing these languages [1].
Moreover, such recognizer-based parsers avoid hard or
undecidable problems inherent in typical ad hoc parsers.
Analogously, sending information works like parsing: by
unparsing the system’s internal representation of information
into a document [2].
Unfortunately, developers aim for easy-to-use solutions
that can be implemented with low effort. Grammars,
(un)parsers, and strong data types are not the first
choice when building software that reads or writes
documents conforming to context-free languages. The
seeming simplicity of creating documents by treating all
kinds of values as strings and substituting them into
templates lures developers. This trend is most notable
for XML-based formats even though it negates the actual
structuring aspect of using XML. This simplification results
in systems that work fine for most cases as long as
security is not considered a critical success factor. However
from a security viewpoint, the simplifications in (un)parsing
introduced by developers are vulnerabilities during input
data processing that can be exploited to control the behavior
of the system [1] or, in case of unparsing, influence the
created document in a way not intended by the developer.
Well-known instances of these input based vulnerabilities are
buffer overflows, SQL injections, cross-site scripting (XSS),
etc. Injection attacks are not limited to the web world. Every
program that uses input data to produce a document in a
context-free language may be vulnerable to this class of
attack.
To correctly embed input data into a document,
encoders, also called sanitizers, must be used during
unparsing as they escape or filter data that is used as
a keyword or control token in the language, so that the
developer-intended semantics of the document cannot be
changed by maliciously crafted input data. As complex
languages like HTML have multiple contexts, where each
context requires a different encoding of input data, encoding
has to be done during unparsing, because the context is
unknown in advance. Developers who use unstructured
string substitution or templates to assemble documents have
to manually determine the context within the document and
apply the correct context-specific encoder to prevent input
injection. An empirical analysis by Saxena, et. al. [3] as well
as countless input-based vulnerabilities classified by SANS
and OWASP [4], [5] show this method of processing to be
very error-prone.
Research on approaches to ease the processing of formal
languages has a long history starting with generating
parsers from grammars [6] and automatically formatting
documents [7], [8], which lead to the more general concept
of unparsing [2].
Efforts on preventing injection attacks for the languages
HTML and JavaScript solved cross-site scripting more
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or less successfully [9] by introducing context-sensitive
encoder [10]. However, these encoders have to be used
for languages other than HTML as well, since input-based
security vulnerabilities have been identified in cars,
industrial control systems, and almost all other IT systems.
To ease the development and the correct use of
context-sensitive encoders for custom languages, we
aim to derive context-sensitive encoders and decoders
from context-free grammars and integrate them into the
(un)parsing or process to provide correct unparsing of
maliciously crafted input data for all context-free languages.
The approach presented in this paper integrates the encoder
definition into context-free grammars and provides a
generator to derive unparsers, context-sensitive encoders,
and parsers as well as context-sensitive decoders. The
generated language processing tools provide an interface
to read and write documents, enforcing that input data
neither influences the structure of the document nor change
its intended semantics. Therefore, developers who use the
generated tools do not need to care about security-relevant
encoding and injection attacks are prevented from the
beginning.
By integrating encoding into the language definition,
our approach shifts away the problem of correct encoding
from the application developer to the language developer
who should be aware of all specialties introduced into the
language. In case application developers decide to let bigger
parts of the output document be controlled by input data as a
whole, they need to enter the field of language development.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: We
first review related work. In Section III, we analyze the issue
of correct unparsing and encoding of maliciously crafted
input data. Our approach to this problem is presented in
Section IV, including composition of languages and their
feature reduction to use them as input data. We evaluate this
approach by taking the example of HTML and JavaScript in
Section V and draw an outlook and conclusion in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Parsing [6] and unparsing [2], [7], [8] are research fields
with a long history. Unparsers are also called pretty-printers
if they produce pretty looking documents. Pretty-printers
are generated from context-free grammars [11] and vice
versa [12] to avoid redundancy and inconsistency [13].
Several language workbenches exist [14] that support
developers during language development and processing.
The Rascal meta-programming language [15] is used to
parse, analyze, transform and unparse source code. In
addition, it supports the use of a grammar of an output
document to ensure syntactically correct unparsing of the
document’s parse tree. Hence, Rascal offers helpful tools for
implementing our approach. Another language workbench,
similar to the MontiCore [16] approach for defining
languages that we use in this work, is the Eclipse-based
Xtext [17], which uses context-free grammars for language
definition and generates language processing tools for the
Eclipse IDE.
To help developers implement secure systems, the
Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) aims to
raise awareness [4] for web application security, provides
education [18], and develops libraries for the correct
processing of user input in web applications [19].
Different frameworks exist to automatically prevent XSS.
Weinberger et al. [9] studied 14 of these frameworks and
found only one sanitizing input data within all HTML,
JavaScript, CSS, and URI contexts. Analyzing 8 popular
open source web applications they found nearly all using all
contexts within HTML related languages, which emphasizes
the demand for context-sensitive encoders. In order to
fix cross-site scripting in existing applications with only
minimal modification, XSS-Guard [20] instruments the
application and sends a request twice to the application:
the first time with the actual user input and the second
time with a safe dummy input. Subsequently, XSS detection
works by comparing the responses and searching for DOM
differences. Hence XSS-Guard assumes that users are not
allowed to insert any HTML into the response.
A more constructive way of preventing injection attacks is
to wrap around the language (e.g. SQL) a strong typed API
to produce documents in this language like SQL DOM [21]
or Java prepared statements do. Bravenboer et al. generalized
this approach with StringBorg [22], which generates a
strongly typed API for an arbitrary guest language (e.g.
SQL) from its grammar in a chosen host language (e.g.
Java). In addition, StringBorg embeds the syntax of the guest
language into the host language, providing developers with
a fluent integration of the two languages, while at the same
time requiring both a complete grammar of both the guest
and host languages.
Another more formal approach by Samuel et al. [10]
proposes and implements a type system for template
languages used in web applications. The type system is used
to determine the HTML context when user input is inserted
into a template and subsequently the sensitization engine
calls the correct context-sensitive encoder for the input data.
A similar approach from the unparsing research field by
Danielsson [23] proposes an unparser which enforces correct
data types in the unparsed document.
Our presented approach shares the fundamental notion
with existing work on Language-theoretic security
(LangSec) [24] that shotgun parsers [1], [25] will not solve
the input validation problem. In addition, we perceive
that input handling does not stop after parsing but is a
challenge when producing output as well. Applying formal
approaches, like the ones already proposed [1], [24], [26],
to unparsing looks promising.
Blitzableiter [27] by Felix “FX” Lindner uses strict
parsing to safely recognize the SWF format and then
unparses a SWF document from the correctly parsed content,
which is subsequently passed to the vulnerable Flash Player.
The strict parsing of Blitzableiter validates the entire SWF
structure and hence mitigates several vulnerabilities in Flash
Player that could be exploited by maliciously crafted SWF
content. With Blitzableiter, our approach shares the idea of
validating data on the AST and consequently producing only
correctly formatted data.
In summary, there are libraries and frameworks for
correctly processing input data in HTML, some to
be applied manually in the correct context, some for
automatically detecting contexts. Furthermore, there are
language workbenches for easing the development of new
languages. Although generating parsers and unparsers is
not a new approach, and type systems for unparsers
and templates have been proposed, there is no approach
for deriving context-sensitive encoders from context-free
grammars.
III. THE PROBLEM OF CORRECT UNPARSING AND
ENCODING
To analyze the core problem behind injection attacks like
SQL injection and XSS, we take a look at how documents
written in a given language are used for communication in
distributed systems.
First, the language used for communication should be
defined by a context-free grammar [24], so that documents
can be formally recognized, i.e. accepted as a member of
the language or rejected. When receiving a document, a
system uses a parser to read the information contained
in the document into a parse tree. This tree is then
refined to an abstract syntax tree (AST) that is used
by system developers within the program logic to access
the information from the document. Sending information
analogously works by unparsing the data provided by the
developer within the AST into a document. We follow the
definition by Danielsson [23] and Arnoldus et al. [28] of a
correct (un)parse round-trip, i.e., the (un)parsing process for
a given language is a correct round-trip, if for every AST x
holds parse(unparse(x)) = x. However, we extend this
property as follows:
Within the program logic, it is common to pass
information from the input to another system using some
language L. For example, data from an HTTP request
is passed into a SQL statement or directly into an
HTML response. An adversary who sends a specially
crafted document to the system might exploit injection
vulnerabilities within all components in the processing
logic, resulting in an AST m of the output document that
contains maliciously crafted input data. The data in AST
m is considered malicious if @d ∈ L : parse(d) = m
holds. An injection vulnerability in this context means
that the adversary is able to produce documents in the
language L that are not intended by the developer. Parsers
and unparsers that have a correct round-trip for the
AST m containing maliciously crafted data prevent this
class of vulnerability by correctly encoding data from the
AST into a document and safely parsing the document:
parsedecode(unparseencode(m)) = m. This property of
a correct (un)parse round-trip explicitly assumes that data
tokens within the AST may contain maliciously crafted data,
whereas Danielsson and Arnoldus et al. assumed the AST to
contain only valid (previously parsed) data within the data
tokens.
In contrast to this formal unparsing process, developers
often use more lightweight mechanisms like templates and
string substitution and concatenation to produce documents,
as these mechanisms do not require a formal definition of
the produced document’s language up front. Although this
approach is easier to use, it falls short when maliciously
crafted input data is inserted into a template, as the data
may contain control tokens [29] of the language, which are
inserted into the resulting document. Parsing this document
will result in a different AST and hence exploit an injection
vulnerability, as the unparse process was not correct. One
commonly used solution is to implement encoder functions
that remove control tokens from data or encode them
using escape sequences. As different contexts within a
language have different control tokens, each context needs
an individual encoder. For example JavaScript requires a
different encoding when used within an HTML script tag
context than in an onclick-attribute context. So when using
input data within a template, developers have to correctly
identify the context into which the data is written and apply
the corresponding encoder. If an encoder is used in a context
it was not made for, it may encode some control characters
by coincidence, but fail to encode others. This can represent
an injection vulnerability.
The existence of countless input based vulnerabilities [4],
[5] and an empirical analysis by Saxena et.al. [3] emphasize
that many developers need help in solving this problem.
Although considerable effort has been spent to develop
encoding libraries [19] and frameworks [9] for wide-spread
languages like HTML and SQL, these cannot be reused
if another language is used for communication. This is a
pressing issue especially in domains where security is still an
emerging concern, such as cars and industrial manufacturing.
To prevent injection attacks during software development,
developers need to define the languages of all documents
used for communication in a system. Not many developers
will take on this complex task unless the language
definition process is as simple as writing a string to a
file. Therefore, approaches that ease the language definition
and (un)parsing during development will help to prevent
injection vulnerabilities as well.
IV. DEFINING CORRECT UNPARSER AND ENCODER
Following the approach of producing documents by
unparsing, let us consider a context-free grammar definition
of a language L and an AST x of a document written in
L. Program logic developers use the AST as an interface to
the document written in L, so they store input data into the
data tokens of x at the places where this input data should
be placed within the output document. Hence maliciously
crafted input data aiming at injecting control tokens into L
is stored into these data tokens as well.
By utilizing the regular expression that defines the data
token within the grammar, an unparser can validate if the
data token complies with the definition of the token. To
prevent an injection vulnerability, the unparser can simply
stop unparsing this document. Although this approach would
prevent injections for tokens where the regular expression
is formulated sharp enough, it ultimately prevents control
tokens from being used within legal input data, e.g. books
published by O’Reilly won’t work in a SQL query.
1 package de.se_rwth.format;
2
3 grammar Container {
4 options {
5 nostring nomlcomments noslcomments
6 noident lexer lookahead = 4
7 }
8
9 Body = LCURLY Element* RCURLY;
10 Element = "tags"
11 LCURLY TagsToken RCURLY;
12 token LCURLY = "{"; token RCURLY = "}";
13
14 encodeTable TagsToken = {
15 "{" -> "&#x0123;", "}" -> "&#x0125;",
16 "&" -> "&#x0038;", " " -> "&#x0020;"
17 };
18
19 subparser token TagsToken =
20 (˜(’{’ | ’}’ | ’ ’))+
21 ;
22 }
Listing 1. MontiCore Grammar example with integrated encoder and sub
parser definition
To bypass this limitation, escape sequences are used to
encode control tokens within data tokens. As mentioned
before, escape sequences are context-specific, and a context
corresponds to a token in the language’s grammar. Hence,
in our approach, we allow language developers to add an
encoding table for every token defined in the grammar.
This table defines the context-specific encoding for that
token using encoding rules that translate a control token
to an escape sequence within the data token. As shown
by the encoding table for the token TagsToken in the
example grammar in listing 1, we integrate the encoding
table definition into the grammar.
Defining encoding rules is a crucial step during language
definition because control tokens that are missing in the
encoding table or whose encoding results in another control
token lead to injection vulnerabilities in the unparser that
is derived from the encoding table. To make this critical
task easier, a default encoding table that encodes all control
tokens not allowed in a data token is much appreciated. This
would prevent errors in the encoding definition.
While the unparser context-sensitively encodes data
tokens when transforming an AST into a document, the
parser needs to decode data tokens when reading a document
to enable a correct (un)parser round-trip.
1 package de.se_rwth.format;
2
3 grammar Tag {
4 options {
5 nostring nomlcomments
6 noslcomments noident
7 }
8
9 Tags = Tag (COMMA Tag)*;
10
11 Tag = LT TEXT GT;
12
13 token LT = "<";
14 token GT = ">";
15 token COMMA = ",";
16 token TEXT =
17 (
18 ˜(’<’ | ’>’ | ’\\’ | ’,’)
19 |
20 (
21 ’\\’
22 (’<’ | ’>’ | ’\\’ | ’,’)
23 )
24 )+
25 ;
26
27 encodeTable TEXT = {
28 "\\" -> "\\\\",
29 "," -> "\\,",
30 ">" -> "\\>",
31 "<" -> "\\<"
32 };
33 }
Listing 2. MontiCore Grammar example with integrated encoder definition
A. Language Composition
Documents that contain different kinds of information,
e.g. structural and behavioral information, are commonly
written in a composed language, e.g. a composition
of HTML and JavaScript. One way to compose a
super-language A and sub-language B is by replacing a
nonterminal in the grammar of A with the start symbol
of B’s grammar. In this way, a parser constructed from
the composed grammar accepts documents of the composed
language.
When unparsing a composed language, the order in which
encoders defined in both languages are applied is critical to
achieving a correct (un)parse round-trip.
The encoder application has to start at the most nested
language B, which is unparsed to a string and placed into
the AST data token of the outer language A where B is
embedded. Then the unparser of A applies the encoding
defined by the tables in A to its tokens, so that the data
token that contains B is encoded again, if an encoding table
is defined for it. This encoding process is applied for each
language - from the most deeply nested to the outmost. By
using this application order of encoders, a token from the
sub-language is encoded as defined by its encoding table,
and afterwards the whole string resulting from the unparsed
sub-language is encoded to fit it into the data token of the
super-language. So in essence the sub-language token is
encoded first by its encoder and then by the encoder of the
data token of the super-language, where the sub-language is
imbedded. Listing 1 and 2 show an example of a composed
language, where the keyword subparser is used to mark
a token as containing a sub-language.
Of course the order in which encoders are applied
needs to correspond to the order in which decoders are
applied when parsing the composed language. Here, it is
important to first parse the super-language, then decode
its tokens, and after decoding parse the sub-language, as
the decoding changes escape sequences back to control
tokens of the super-language, which might influence the
parsing of the inner language. This way control tokens of the
super-language may be used in an encoded representation in
the sub-language so that the parser of the super-language
is not influenced by the sub-language. This allows, for
example, to easily embed a language into its own data token
after having correctly defined the encoding table of that
token.
B. Reducing Language Features
Up to now we focused on injections that modify the
structure of the document, also known as ’injecting up’ [30].
Now let us take a look on ’injecting down’, where control
tokens are injected into a context to modify the meaning
of the statement without breaking out of the context. For
example when developers intend to let users create a part of
the output document, e.g. by allowing HTML in forums or
wikis. This user input needs to be parsed and validated to
remove tokens which a user should not be able to inject into
the output document. Just like a firewall can be configured
to filter out unwanted network traffic, a filter for unwanted
tokens is needed.
There are at least two options to solve this problem: First,
the grammar of the output document can be reduced to allow
only a subset of the original language. This is appropriate
if there is a really nasty feature of the output language
that neither the user or developer should use. This kind of
reduction does not help in many cases as most developers
will need to use all language features at some point. Hence,
the grammar needs to be rewritten, such that the reduced
language is only used for some tokens, e.g. HTML-tags
named in a specific way. This can be achieved by changing
grammar productions or by adding an encoding table and a
sub-language which encodes the tokens not allowed in the
user input.
As rewriting the output document’s grammar based on
properties of tokens is not a very elegant or easy solution, an
alternative is to define a grammar for the reduced language
and use it to recognize and validate the input during parsing
independently of the unparsing of the output document. This
validated input is then copied from the input AST into
the output document’s AST. In this approach, we use the
reduced input language to prevent ’injecting down’ and the
non-reduced output language to prevent ’injecting up’.
Here, we have a usability trade-off: Reducing the output
grammar is a safe way to embed input data into an output
document, as all inputs, no matter where they come from,
are correctly unparsed into the output document. However,
it is not as handy as using the reduced grammar to filter the
input. Therefore, for systems where the input is directly used
within the output without modification, the latter approach
appears to be suitable.
In contrast, for systems with a complex processing logic,
which changes the input or enriches it using data from
multiple sources, a reduced output grammar is inevitable.
This is because the processing logic inserts data that the
unparser assumes to be valid, but in fact may contain
forbidden parts of the output language. This issue cannot
be fixed by validating all inputs when they enter the system,
as the validation needs to consider the context where the
input is used in the output document.
C. Implementation
To show the feasibility of our approach, we implemented
it within the MontiCore framework. The framework
generates parsers, unparsers, encoders, and decoders from
the context-free MontiCore grammar, which defines tokens
that contain a sub-language, e.g. line 19 of listing 1, and
encoding tables, e.g. in line 27-32 of listing 2 for the TEXT
token.
Although the compact representation of an encoding table
within the MontiCore grammar is useful when developing
a new format, it is not when encoder libraries already
exist or the encoding can be written more compact in
program code. In these cases, the implementation allows for
the replacement of generated encoders for specific tokens
with encoding functions defined in Java code. To limit the
effect of errors in the encoding table definition and encoder
implementation from a library, an encoded data token is
validated using the regular expression that defines the token.
This check may prevent an injection, if the token definition
is strictly defined and does not allow control tokens.
An issue when developers use this approach is that
creating an AST using program code is quite tedious.
So to improve the applicability of the approach we use
templates like the one in listing 3 to define a basic structure
of the output document’s AST. The template needs to be
a valid document of the language, as we use the generated
parser to create the AST from it. Variables like #name# in
the template end up in data tokens within the AST and are
replaced with (input) data provided by the developer. To add
more control and data tokens to the AST, the developer can
alter the AST before unparsing it.
V. EVALUATION
We evaluate our solution by taking an example of HTML
and JavaScript, as XSS is a prominent problem, and there
are tools for testing applications for XSS.
For both languages, we developed a grammar that we
composed to define the combined language.
In HTML there are different contexts where JavaScript is
embedded and encoded in different ways, which makes the
definition of the language more complex. The symbols <, >,
and & need to be encoded in every HTML-tag’s body except
a script-tag’s body. As a result, in the HTML grammar two
different contexts and hence tokens have to be defined for
a tag’s body depending on the tag’s name: one for a script
tag body and another one for all other HTML-tag bodies.
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2 <!DOCTYPE html>
3 <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
4 <head> <title>Example Page</title> </head>
5 <body>
6 <form method="GET" action="#actionURL#">
7 <label for="input_name"> Name: </label>
8 <input type="text" id="input_name"
9 name="name" value="#name#" />
10 <input type="submit" value="Register"/>
11 </form>
12 <div>
13 <p>#name#</p>
14 <button
15 onclick="alert(&quot;#name#&quot;);"
16 >Test1</button>
17 <button onclick="alert(’#name#’);"
18 >Test2</button>
19 <input type="text" name="input"
20 value="#name#" />
21 <script>
22 var name ="#name#" + ’#name#’;
23 </script>
24 </div>
25 </body>
26 </html>
Listing 3. HTML/JavaScript template with markers actionURL
and name
To make things worse, HTML is also inconsistent with
contexts where HTML and JavaScript are allowed. Within a
tag’s attribute, the symbols <, > and & as well as quotation
marks must be encoded. However, in attributes containing
JavaScript, like the onclick-attribute, those characters have
to be encoded like in every other attribute. This results in
alert(’&quot;’); opening a pop up message &quot;,
if it is used in a script tag’s body and a message
with a quotation mark when used in an onclick-attribute.
Furthermore the comparison (5 &lt; 6) works in an
onclick-attribute but not in an script-tag’s body. We
successfully implemented all these special cases using
encoding tables.
Utilizing the generated parser, decoder, encoder, and
unparser, we developed a web application that provides an
HTML form with input fields. To produce an HTML output
document that includes the input data at different contexts,
the template in listing 3 is used to set up the AST, and data
tokens marked with #...# are replaced by input data.
This setup enables us to use manual and automated
penetration testing (the standard approach for finding input
validation vulnerabilities in web applications) to test our
generated encoder and decoder. We use the Zed Attack
Proxy (ZAP) [31] as an interception proxy to test the web
application for reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities.
As a first step, we used the “Active Scan” to automatically
find vulnerabilities by sending XSS strings to the web
application. Therefore, we configured the “Cross Site
Scripting (Refelected)”, “CRLF injection”, and “Parameter
tampering” option with threshold for notifications to “Low”
and set the strength to “Insane”. In this configuration, ZAP
sent 100 attack strings and raised two alerts. Both alarms
are raised for the input ;alert(1), and the output of the
test application is shown in listing 4
1 <button onclick=
2 "alert(&quot;;alert(1)&quot;);">
3 Test
4 </button>
5
6 <button onclick=
7 "alert(&apos;;alert(1)&apos;);">
8 Test
9 </button>
Listing 4. ZAP alarts found with active scan
These are false positives, as both values are correctly
encoded JavaScript string literals enclosed in an HTML
attribute.
In a second step, we used the XSS attack strings from
FuzzDB, which are integrated to ZAP to manually test the
application. We grouped the attack strings for similar attacks
and chose several strings from each group resulting in a
subset of eleven strings. These strings are submitted to all
output contexts marked in listing 3 and checked for correct
presentation in a browser. All tested strings from FuzzDB
were encoded correctly. Therefore, the browser displayed
them and did not execute them as JavaScript.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Software that consumes input and uses this input to
produce documents written in a formal language faces the
problem of preventing input injection in the document.
Well-known and widespread vulnerabilities that arise when
input is injected are typically named after the language of the
document, e.g. SQL injection, or cross-site scripting (XSS)
in case of HTML and JavaScript. Such naming masks the
common nature of these vulnerabilities.
To prevent input injection, the input data has to be
encoded so that it does not contain control tokens of the
document. However in many cases documents have multiple
contexts where input data has to be encoded differently.
Hence, data encoding cannot be done during input parsing
but has to be applied during the document creation
depending on the context within the output document.
In this paper we worked on the problem of correct
unparsing and encoding maliciously crafted user data into
a document whose language is defined by a context free
grammar. In addition, we examined how parts of the output
document can be defined by input data using only a subset
of the output document’s language features.
We presented an approach to define encoders and
decoders along with the language’s grammar and used
the MontiCore framework to implement a generator that
derives context-sensitive encoders and decoders from that
definition to correctly encode maliciously crafted data during
document creation. For the safe definitions of parts of the
document using input data, we discussed the approaches of
reducing the output language and validating the input along
with their advantages and disadvantages. We evaluated the
generated encoder and decoder by taking the example of
HTML and JavaScript using the penetration testing tools
ZAP and FuzzDB and found no context where cross-site
scripting was possible.
The presented approach allows developers to prevent
input-based attacks such as XSS on all context-free
languages they are using as an output, once the language
and its encoding rules are defined.
Clearly we assume an idealized world here, where
unparsers and parsers are generated from the same grammar.
Considering the differences in parser implementations adds
another dimension to the problem of correct unparsing and
encoding. Following the presented approach, we plan to
evaluate the implemented framework for various custom
formats defined by developers to study the use of the
framework in software development projects. In addition we
plan to support default encoding tables and search for ways
to improve the auditing of input data processing.
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